Batalha de Emmendingen, 19 de outubro de 1796

Batalha de Emmendingen, 19 de outubro de 1796


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Batalha de Emmendingen, 19 de outubro de 1796

Retire-se para o Reno
O terreno
Posições e planos austríacos
O Plano Francês
A batalha
20 de outubro

A batalha de Emmendingen (19 de outubro de 1796) foi uma vitória austríaca que removeu qualquer chance de que o exército do general Moreau do Reno e Mosela pudesse manter uma posição segura na margem oriental do Reno no final de sua retirada de sul da Alemanha.

No verão de 1796, os franceses lançaram uma invasão da Alemanha em duas frentes. Moreau chegou aos arredores de Munique antes de descobrir que Jourdan havia sido derrotado em Amberg e Würzburg e estava recuando para o Reno. Moreau começou uma lenta retirada de volta para o oeste, com um exército austríaco sob o comando do general Latour logo atrás. Moreau ainda não estava pronto para abandonar sua campanha completamente, e em 2 de outubro voltou atrás e infligiu uma derrota custosa a Latour em Biberach, mas o arquiduque Carlos estava agora começando a ameaçar sua retaguarda, e Moreau foi forçado a continuar sua retirada.

Retire-se para o Reno

No dia seguinte à vitória em Biberach, Moreau ainda estava em uma posição potencialmente perigosa. O Exército do Reno e Mosela estava a oitenta milhas a leste da relativa segurança do vale do Reno, na margem sul do Danúbio. Para chegar ao Reno, eles teriam que cruzar duas cadeias de montanhas - a Alb e a Floresta Negra. O exército de Latour havia sido derrotado em Biberach, mas não destruído, e ainda estava seguindo sua retirada. Os generais Nauendorf e Petrasch se juntaram em Hechingen, na encosta norte do Alb. Os austríacos também tinham tropas ao norte de Estrasburgo, nas margens orientais do Reno, e a derrota final do exército de Jourdan em Altenkirchen (19 de setembro) havia liberado o arquiduque Carlos para ir para o sul com reforços.

Moreau esperava cruzar a Floresta Negra usando o vale de Kinzig, o que o teria levado para o vale do Reno perto de Estrasburgo, mas agora essa rota estava fechada para ele. Em vez disso, ele decidiu usar o Höllental. Este vale atravessa uma das seções mais altas da Floresta Negra, 32 quilômetros ao norte da fronteira com a Suíça, indo de Hinterzarten, no leste, a Kirchzarten e Buchenbach, no meio das montanhas. Um vale mais amplo corre para oeste até Freiburg im Breisgau, na orla das planícies do Reno.

Essa rota logo deixou o exército bastante estendido. Enquanto a maior parte do exército se mudou para Riedlingen, dez milhas a oeste de Biberach no Danúbio, a guarda avançada cruzou o Alb e capturou Villengen e Rothweit, em direção ao extremo sul da lacuna entre o Alb e a Floresta Negra. A ala esquerda do exército os seguiu e assumiu uma posição em Rothweit, voltada para o norte para se proteger contra qualquer movimento de Nauendorf. A ala direita do exército mudou-se para Tuttlingen, no extremo sul do Alb, e virou para o leste para enfrentar Latour.

O centro do exército, sob Saint-Cyr, forçou a passagem do Höllental. Os dois batalhões austríacos que guardavam a passagem, sob o comando do coronel Aspres, foram forçados a recuar para fora do vale e para Emmendingen, seis milhas ao norte de Freiburg im Breisgau. São Cyr entrou em Friburgo em 12 de outubro, e o resto do exército seguiu pela passagem nos dias seguintes. O equipamento mais pesado seguiu uma rota mais ao sul e foi para Huningue, quase na fronteira com a Suíça, protegido pelas brigadas de Tharreau e Paillard, que travaram uma série de ações menores de retaguarda contra as tropas leves do general Froelich.

O próximo objetivo de Moreau era abrir comunicações com o campo fortificado de Kehl, em frente a Estrasburgo, onde ele cruzou o Reno pela primeira vez em junho. Em vez de cruzar novamente o Reno e avançar pela margem oeste controlada pelos franceses até Estrasburgo, ele decidiu lutar para subir na margem leste.

O terreno

A batalha de Emmendingen ocorreu no vale Elz. Este vale ziguezagueia através da Floresta Negra antes de emergir na planície do Reno ao norte de Friburgo em Breisgau. A seção do vale envolvida na batalha segue para sudoeste através das montanhas de Elzach, através de Bleibach e Waldkirch. A sudoeste de Waldkirch, o rio emerge das montanhas e vira à direita, fluindo para noroeste em direção ao Reno, com a Floresta Negra à sua direita. Esta seção do rio passa por Emmendingen e chega a Riegel. Em 1796, o rio virou para o norte em Riegel e correu paralelo à Floresta Negra até alcançar o Reno, um pouco ao norte. Riegel fica em uma lacuna estreita entre a Floresta Negra e um afloramento isolado de colinas vulcânicas conhecido como Kaiserstuhl.

Posições e planos austríacos

As chances de sucesso de Moreau neste empreendimento pioravam a cada dia que passava. Em 15 de outubro, o arquiduque Carlos chegou a Offenburg, quinze milhas a sudeste de Kehl, onde se juntou à ala esquerda de Petrasch e Nauenbourg. Latour emergiu do vale de Kinzig em 17 de outubro e, em 18 de outubro, atingiu o acampamento de Mahlberg, quinze milhas mais ao sul. Condé e Froelich estavam em Neustadt, na extremidade leste do Höllental, e o General Wolf estava um pouco mais ao sul, em Waldshut. O arquiduque originalmente queria lançar um ataque contra os franceses em 18 de outubro, mas os homens de Latour precisavam de um dia para se recuperar de sua marcha e, portanto, o ataque foi adiado para o dia seguinte.

O arquiduque dividiu seu exército em quatro colunas. O general Nauendorff estava no vale do alto Elz com 6.000 homens (8 batalhões e 14 esquadrões). Ele deveria avançar para sudoeste em direção a Waldkirch.

Feldzeugmeister Wilhelm Graf Wartensleben, com 8.500 homens (12 batalhões e 23 esquadrões) avançaria para o sul através do sopé da Floresta Negra e capturaria a ponte Elz em Emmendingen.

O general Latour, com 6.000 homens (8 batalhões e 15 esquadrões) também deveria cruzar o sopé da Floresta Negra via Heimbach e Malterdingen (a leste de Riegel) e capturar a ponte de Köndringen, a meio caminho entre Riegel e Emmendingen.

General Karl Alois, Príncipe de Fürstenberg, manteve Kenzingen, 2-3 milhas ao norte de Riegel no curso original do Elz. Ele recebeu ordens de fazer manifestações contra Riegel e proteger Rust, Kappel e Grafenhausen, ao norte da principal posição austríaca.

Mais ao sul, o General Froelich e o Príncipe de Condé deveriam derrubar o General Ferino e a direita francesa no vale Stieg.

O Plano Francês

O plano de ataque de Moreau era uma imagem espelhada quase exata do plano austríaco. O general Delmas deveria atacar Riegel, onde ele entraria em confronto com o Príncipe de Fürstenberg.

O general Beauput ocuparia as alturas de Malterdingen (3 milhas a noroeste de Emmendingen) e Kondringen. Ele enfrentaria a coluna de Latour.

A primeira divisão do centro era segurar Emmendingen, onde seria atacado por Wartensleben.

Saint-Cyr, com a segunda divisão do centro, deveria atacar o nordeste do vale de Elz em direção a Bleibach, onde ele iria de cabeça para Nauendorff.

O ataque envolveria apenas o centro de seu exército, pois o general Desaix com a ala esquerda estava ao sul, enquanto o general Ferino, com a direita, guardava as passagens pela Floresta Negra. Como resultado, o Moreau foi superado em número pelo Arquiduque, embora apenas cerca de 20.000 austríacos estivessem envolvidos no ataque.

A batalha

A luta nas montanhas seguiu o caminho dos austríacos. Ao amanhecer, Saint-Cyr começou a avançar pelo vale Elz, enquanto Nauendorf se preparava para descer o vale. Saint-Cyr decidiu enviar uma segunda pequena coluna através das montanhas ao leste do vale, visando a aldeia de Simonswald, localizada em um vale lateral. Ele esperava que essa força atingisse a esquerda de Nauendorf e o forçasse a se retirar de Bleibach. Infelizmente para os franceses, Nauendorf postou flanqueadores nas colinas ao longo do vale Elz e os homens de Saint-Cyr foram emboscados por fuzileiros austríacos. Do outro lado do vale Elz, mais fuzileiros austríacos alcançaram uma posição dominante em Kolnau, com vista para Waldkirch. Saint-Cyr foi forçado a cancelar o avanço sobre Bleibach e retirou-se para Waldkirch. Nauendorf continuou a pressioná-lo, e Saint-Cyr foi forçado a recuar mais duas milhas para Denzlingen.

Por volta do meio-dia, as duas colunas de Latour atacaram Beaupuy em Matterdingen. Beaupuy foi morto no início da luta e na confusão que isso fez com que sua divisão não recebesse ordem de recuar ao longo do Elz para Wasser, ao sul de Emmendingen.

Wartensleben, no centro austríaco, levou o dia todo para abrir caminho até Emmendingen. Duas de suas colunas foram sustentadas por fuzileiros franceses postados na floresta de Landeck mantida, três quilômetros ao norte de Emmendingen, e ele próprio foi gravemente ferido. Os franceses foram forçados a recuar no final do dia, quando a terceira coluna de Wartensleben ameaçou flanquear sua direita. Os franceses então recuaram para o outro lado do rio, destruindo as pontes atrás deles.

No final do dia, Moreau estava em uma posição muito ruim. Delmas estava em Riegel e Endingen, no canto nordeste do Kaiserstuhl. A direita de Saint-Cyr estava atrás de Denzlingen e a sua esquerda em Unterreute. O centro francês estava em Nimburg, a meio caminho entre Riegel e Unterreute. A linha francesa estava voltada para o nordeste em direção aos austríacos. Durante a noite de 19 a 20 de outubro, os austríacos consertaram a ponte em Emmendingen e, na manhã de 20 de outubro, o arquiduque estava acampado perto de Denzlingen.

20 de outubro

Em 20 de outubro, Moreau finalmente abandonou qualquer plano de avanço pela margem leste do Reno. Desaix recebeu ordens de cruzar o Reno em Brisach (no extremo sul do Kaiserstuhl e dez milhas a oeste de Friburgo) e avançar para o norte em direção a Estrasburgo e Kehl.

O centro francês retirou-se de suas posições mais avançadas e assumiu uma nova posição atrás do Dresiam (o fluxo que vai de Freiburg ao norte até Riegel). Ferino, com a ala direita do exército, ainda estava no vale de Saint-Pierre, e se os franceses perdessem Friburgo, ele ficaria preso entre Condé e Froelich no vale e o arquiduque nas planícies.

Os franceses resistiram ao longo do Dresiam apenas o tempo suficiente para permitir que Ferino chegasse em segurança. Condé e Froelich estavam logo atrás e, quando abriram fogo contra a direita francesa em Freiburg, Saint-Cyr foi finalmente forçado a recuar. Mais para o noroeste, Latour abriu caminho através do Dresiam em sua quarta tentativa, e o Príncipe de Fürstenburg capturou Riegel.

Os franceses recuaram nas alturas de Pfaffenweiler e, em seguida, recuaram em direção à ponte em Huningue, perto de Basiléia. Em 22 de outubro, Moreau alcançou Schliengen, dez milhas ao norte de Huningue, e decidiu tomar posição para cobrir sua retirada do outro lado do rio.

Página inicial napoleônica | Livros sobre as Guerras Napoleônicas | Índice de assuntos: Guerras Napoleônicas


Batalha de Emmendingen, 19 de outubro de 1796 - História

Na Batalha de Emmendingen, em 19 de outubro de 1796, o Exército Francês de Rhin-et-Moselle sob Jean Victor Marie Moreau lutou contra o Primeiro Exército de Coalizão do Alto Reno comandado pelo Arquiduque Charles, Duque de Teschen. Emmendingen está localizada às margens do rio Elz em Baden-Württemberg, Alemanha, ao norte de Freiburg im Breisgau. A ação ocorreu durante a Guerra da Primeira Coalizão, a primeira fase das grandes Guerras Revolucionárias Francesas. Depois de um verão de defesa entre os dois lados, os franceses já estavam se retirando pela Floresta Negra para o Reno. Em uma perseguição próxima, os austríacos forçaram o comandante francês a dividir sua força para que pudesse cruzar o Reno em três pontos através das pontes em Kehl, Breisach e Hüningen. Em meados de setembro, porém, os austríacos controlavam as abordagens para os cruzamentos em Breisach e Kehl. Moreau ainda queria que metade de seu exército se aproximasse dos austríacos em Kehl. O terreno acidentado em Emmendingen complicou a luta, tornando possível para a força dos Habsburgos atacar as tropas francesas e bloquear qualquer passagem em direção a Kehl, o tempo chuvoso e frio dificultou ainda mais os esforços de ambos os lados, transformando riachos e riachos em torrentes de água e tornando as estradas escorregadias. A luta foi feroz, dois generais morreram na batalha, um de cada lado. O sucesso dos Habsburgos em Emmendingen forçou os franceses a abandonar seus planos de uma retirada tripla, ou mesmo dupla. Os franceses continuaram sua retirada pelas cidades nas montanhas da Floresta Negra ao sul, onde os exércitos lutaram na Batalha de Schliengen cinco dias depois.

Inicialmente, os governantes da Europa viam a Revolução Francesa como uma disputa entre o rei francês e seus súditos, e não algo em que eles deveriam interferir. À medida que a retórica revolucionária se tornava mais estridente, eles declararam o interesse dos monarcas da Europa como um com os interesses de Luís XVI e sua família, esta Declaração de Pillnitz (27 de agosto de 1791) ameaçou consequências ambíguas, mas bastante graves, se algo acontecesse aos família real. A posição dos revolucionários tornou-se cada vez mais difícil. Para agravar seus problemas nas relações internacionais, os emigrados franceses continuaram a agitar pelo apoio a uma contra-revolução. Finalmente, em 20 de abril de 1792, a Convenção Nacional Francesa declarou guerra à Áustria. Nesta Guerra da Primeira Coalizão (1792–1798), a França se posicionou contra a maioria dos estados europeus que compartilhavam fronteiras terrestres ou aquáticas com ela, além de Portugal e do Império Otomano. Timothy Blanning. '' The French Revolutionary Wars '', Nova York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 41-59. Apesar de algumas vitórias em 1792, no início de 1793, a França estava em crise: as forças francesas haviam sido expulsas da Bélgica, o rei francês acabara de ser executado e havia uma revolta na Vendéia por causa do recrutamento e do ressentimento generalizado da Constituição Civil do clero. Os exércitos da República Francesa estavam em estado de desordem e os problemas tornaram-se ainda mais agudos após a introdução do recrutamento em massa, a '' levée en masse '', que saturou um exército já em dificuldades com milhares de homens analfabetos e sem treinamento. Para os franceses, a Campanha do Reno de 1795 foi especialmente desastrosa, embora eles tivessem obtido algum sucesso em outros teatros de guerra, incluindo a Guerra dos Pirineus (1793-1795). Os exércitos da Primeira Coalizão incluíam os contingentes imperiais e a infantaria e cavalaria dos vários estados, totalizando cerca de 125.000 (incluindo três corpos autônomos), uma força considerável para os padrões do século XVIII, mas uma força moderada pelos padrões do Revolucionário e Napoleônico guerras. No total, as tropas do comandante-chefe arquiduque Carlos estenderam-se da Suíça ao Mar do Norte e de Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser, da fronteira suíço-italiana ao Adriático. As tropas dos Habsburgos compunham a maior parte do exército, mas a "fina linha branca" Gunther E. Rothenberg, "O Exército dos Habsburgos nas Guerras Napoleônicas (1792-1815)". '' Military Affairs '', 37: 1 (fevereiro de 1973), pp 1 & ndash5, p. 2 citados. A infantaria da Coalizão não conseguiu cobrir o território de Basel a Frankfurt com profundidade suficiente para resistir à pressão de seus oponentes. Em comparação com a cobertura francesa, Charles tinha metade do número de soldados para cobrir uma frente que se estendia de Renchen, perto de Basel, até Bingen. Além disso, ele havia concentrado a maior parte de sua força, comandada pelo conde Baillet Latour, entre Karlsruhe e Darmstadt, onde a confluência do Reno e do Meno fez um ataque, provavelmente os rios ofereceram uma porta de entrada para os estados da Alemanha oriental e, finalmente, para Viena, com boas pontes cruzando uma margem de rio relativamente bem definida. Ao norte, o corpo autônomo de Wilhelm von Wartensleben cobria a linha entre Mainz e Giessen. O exército austríaco consistia de profissionais, muitos trazidos das regiões fronteiriças dos Bálcãs, e recrutas recrutados dos Círculos Imperiais.

Reinício da luta: 1796

Em janeiro de 1796, os franceses e os membros da Primeira Coalizão estabeleceram uma trégua, encerrando a Campanha do Reno de 1795, eles entenderam que era temporária. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, '' Warfare in the Age of Napoleon: The Revolutionary Wars Against the First Coalition in Northern Europe and the Italian Campaign, 1789-1797. '' Leonaur, 2011. pp. 286-287 Blanning, pp. 41-59 . Este acordo durou até 20 de maio de 1796, quando os austríacos anunciaram que terminaria em 31 de maio. O Exército da Coalizão do Baixo Reno incluía 90.000 soldados, principalmente Habsburgos e tropas do "Reichsarmee" (Imperiais) reunidas nos estados do Sacro Império Romano. A ala direita de 20.000 homens sob o duque Ferdinand Frederick Augustus de Württemberg ficou na margem leste do Reno atrás do rio Sieg, observando a cabeça de ponte francesa em Düsseldorf. As guarnições da Fortaleza de Mainz e da Fortaleza de Ehrenbreitstein contaram com mais 10.000. Carlos colocou o restante da força dos Habsburgos e da Coalizão na margem oeste, atrás do Nahe. Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser liderou o exército de 80.000 homens do Alto Reno. Sua ala direita ocupou Kaiserslautern na margem oeste, e a ala esquerda sob Anton Sztáray, Michael von Fröhlich e Louis Joseph, Príncipe de Condé guardou o Reno de Mannheim à Suíça. A estratégia original da coalizão era capturar Trier e usar a posição na margem oeste para atacar cada um dos exércitos franceses. No entanto, chegaram a Viena notícias dos sucessos de Bonaparte. Reconsiderando a situação, o Conselho Áulico deu ao arquiduque Carlos o comando sobre os dois exércitos austríacos e ordenou-lhe que se mantivesse firme e enviou Wurmser para a Itália com 25.000 reforços. A perda de Wurmser e suas tropas enfraqueceu consideravelmente a força da Coalizão. Do lado francês, o Exército de Sambre-et-Meuse de 80.000 homens manteve a margem oeste do Reno até o Nahe e depois a sudoeste até Sankt Wendel. No flanco esquerdo do exército, Jean-Baptiste Kléber tinha 22.000 soldados em um campo entrincheirado em Düsseldorf. A ala direita do Exército de Rhin-et-Moselle foi posicionada atrás do Reno de Hüningen para o norte, seu centro estava ao longo do rio Queich perto de Landau e sua ala esquerda se estendia para oeste em direção a Saarbrücken. Pierre Marie Barthélemy Ferino liderou a ala direita de Moreau, Louis Desaix comandou o centro e Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr dirigiu a ala esquerda. A ala de Ferino consistia em três divisões de infantaria e cavalaria comandadas por François Antoine Louis Bourcier e Henri François Delaborde. O comando de Desaix contava com três divisões lideradas por Michel de Beaupuy, Antoine Guillaume Delmas e Charles Antoine Xaintrailles. A ala de Saint-Cyr tinha duas divisões comandadas por Guillaume Philibert Duhesme e Taponier. O grande plano francês previa que dois exércitos franceses pressionassem os flancos dos exércitos do norte nos estados alemães, enquanto simultaneamente um terceiro exército se aproximava de Viena através da Itália. O exército de Jourdan avançaria para sudeste de Düsseldorf, com a intenção de atrair tropas e atenção para si, o que permitiria ao exército de Moreau uma travessia mais fácil do Reno entre Kehl e Hüningen. De acordo com o plano, o exército de Jourdan fintou em direção a Mannheim, e Charles rapidamente transferiu suas tropas. O exército de Moreau atacou a cabeça de ponte em Kehl, que era guardada por 7.000 soldados imperiais - soldados recrutados naquela primavera do círculo político da Suábia, inexperientes e destreinados - que surpreendentemente manteve a cabeça de ponte por várias horas, mas depois recuou em direção a Rastatt. De 23 a 24 de junho, Moreau reforçou a cabeça de ponte com sua guarda avançada. Depois de empurrar a milícia imperial de seu posto na cabeça de ponte, suas tropas invadiram Baden sem impedimentos. Da mesma forma, no sul, perto da Basileia, a coluna de Ferino moveu-se rapidamente através do rio e continuou subindo o Reno ao longo da costa da Suíça e da Alemanha, em direção ao Lago Constança e na extremidade sul da Floresta Negra. Ansioso que suas linhas de suprimento ficassem sobrecarregadas, Charles começou a recuar para o leste. Nesse ponto, os ciúmes e a competição inerentes entre os generais entraram em jogo. Moreau poderia ter se juntado ao exército de Jourdan no norte, mas ele não prosseguiu para o leste, empurrando Carlos para a Baviera. Jourdan também se moveu para o leste, empurrando o corpo autônomo de Wartensleben para os ducados Ernestine, e nenhum dos generais parecia disposto a unir seu flanco com o de seu compatriota. Dodge, pp. 292-293. Seguiu-se um verão de retiradas estratégicas, flanqueamento e manobras de refluxo. Em ambos os lados, a união de dois exércitos - o de Wartensleben com Carlos ou o de Jourdan com o de Moreau - poderia ter esmagado a oposição. Dodge, pp. 297. Wartensleben e Charles se uniram primeiro, e a maré virou contra os franceses. Com 25.000 de suas melhores tropas, o arquiduque cruzou para a margem norte do Danúbio em Regensburg e mudou-se para o norte para se juntar a seu colega Wartensleben. A derrota do exército de Jourdan nas batalhas de Amberg, Würzburg e Altenkirchen permitiu que Charles movesse mais tropas para o sul. O próximo contato ocorreu em 19 de outubro em Emmendingen. J. Rickard
'' Batalha de Emmendingen ''
História da guerra
17 de fevereiro de 2009. Acessado em 18 de novembro de 2014.

Emmendingen fica no vale Elz, que serpenteia pela Floresta Negra. O Elz cria uma série de vales suspensos que desafiam a passagem de grandes grupos de tropas. O tempo chuvoso complicou ainda mais a passagem pelo vale do Elz. A área ao redor de Riegel am Kaiserstuhl é conhecida por seus loess e pontos de transição estreitos, que influenciaram muito a batalha.

A melhor parte do exército francês desembarcou no vale de Höll. A ala esquerda de Desaix incluía os nove batalhões e 12 esquadrões da Divisão St. Suzanne por Riegel, abrangendo ambas as margens do Elz. À direita, entre Malterdingen e Emmendingen, Beaupuy comandava uma divisão de 12 batalhões e 12 esquadrões. Mais à direita, perto do próprio Emmendingen e nas alturas de Heimbach, ficava Saint-Cyr em torno dessa divisão da Duhesme (12 batalhões e oito esquadrões). Mais à direita destes, no vale Elz perto de Waldkirch ficava a divisão de Ambert e a brigada Girard por Zähringen, cerca de uma milha de distância, a brigada de Lecourbe estava na reserva, e, estendendo-se para o norte de lá, uma divisão montada de 14.000 vagava nas proximidades de Holzhausen (atualmente parte de março, Breisgau). Essas posições criaram uma linha quase longa. Do outro lado da brigada de Lecorbe ficavam os 15 batalhões e 16 esquadrões de Ferino, mas estes ficavam bem ao sul e a leste de Freiburg im Breisgau, ainda vagando pelas montanhas. Todos haviam sido prejudicados por fortes chuvas, o solo estava macio e escorregadio, e os rios Reno e Elz haviam inundado, assim como muitos afluentes. Isso aumentava os riscos de um ataque montado, porque os cavalos não conseguiam se equilibrar. Johann Samuel Ersch
'' Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889, pp. 64-66. Contra isso estava a força do arquiduque. Ao chegar a alguns quilômetros de Emmendingen, o arquiduque dividiu sua força em quatro colunas. A coluna Nauendorf, no alto Elz, tinha oito batalhões e 14 esquadrões, avançando para sudoeste até Waldkirch Wartensleben tinha 12 batalhões e 23 esquadrões avançando para o sul para capturar a ponte Elz em Emmendingen. Latour, com 6.000 homens, deveria cruzar o sopé via Heimbach e Malterdingen e capturar a ponte de Köndringen, entre Riegel e Emmendingen, e a coluna Fürstenberg segurava Kinzingen, ao norte de Riegel. Frölich e Condé (parte da coluna de Nauendorf) foram instruídos a imobilizar Ferino e a ala direita francesa no vale de Stieg.

Os primeiros a chegar a Emmindingen, os franceses asseguraram o ponto alto de Waldkirch, que comandava os vales vizinhos era considerado, na época, uma máxima da tática militar, que o comando das montanhas dava o controle dos vales. Em 19 de outubro, os exércitos se enfrentaram, nas margens do Elz, de Waldkirch a Emmendingen. A essa altura, Moreau sabia que não poderia prosseguir para Kehl ao longo da margem direita do Reno, então decidiu cruzar o Reno mais ao norte, em Breisach. A ponte lá era pequena, porém, e todo o seu exército não poderia passar sem causar um gargalo, então ele enviou apenas a ala esquerda, comandada por Desaix, para cruzar lá. Archibald Alison (Sir Archibald Alison, 1º Baronete) '' History of Europe, '' ondon W. Blackwood and Sons, 1835, pp. 86 e ndash90. Ao amanhecer, Saint-Cyr (francês à direita) avançou ao longo do vale Elz. Nauendorf se preparou para mover suas forças Habsburgo vale abaixo. Vendo isso, Saint-Cyr enviou uma pequena coluna através das montanhas a leste do vale principal, para a aldeia de Simonswald, localizada em um vale lateral. Ele os instruiu a atacar a esquerda de Nauendorf e a forçá-lo a se retirar de Bleibach. Antecipando isso, porém, Nauendorf já havia postado unidades nas colinas ao longo do vale Elz, de onde atiradores austríacos emboscaram os homens de Saint-Cyr. Do outro lado do vale Elz, mais homens armados dos Habsburgos alcançaram Kollnau, que dominava Waldkirch, e de lá eles poderiam atirar contra as forças francesas. A luta foi rápida e furiosa. As posições austríacas superiores forçaram Saint-Cyr a cancelar seu avanço sobre Bleibach e retirar-se para Waldkirch, embora os homens de Nauendorf continuassem a assediá-lo e Saint-Cyr retirou outro para a relativa segurança de Denzlingen. A luta não foi melhor para os franceses à sua esquerda. A guarda avançada de Decaen avançou, embora com cautela. Os atiradores austríacos dispararam contra a coluna e Decaen caiu de seu cavalo, ferido. Beaupuy ocupou o lugar de Decaen com a guarda avançada. Phipps, vol. II, pp. 380 e ndash385. Ao meio-dia, Latour abandonou sua precaução costumeira e enviou duas colunas para atacar Beaupuy entre Malterdingen e Höllental (Val d'Enfer), resultando em um tiroteio feroz. Depois de dar uma ordem de retirada ao longo do Elz, Beaupuy foi morto e sua divisão não recebeu ordem de recuar, causando perdas adicionais para os franceses. No centro, fuzileiros franceses postados na floresta de Landeck, ao norte de Emmendingen, seguravam dois destacamentos de Wartensleben enquanto o terceiro lutava por estradas lamacentas, quase intransitáveis. Os homens de Wartensleben precisaram o dia todo para abrir caminho até Emmendingen e, durante o tiroteio, o braço esquerdo de Wartensleben foi estilhaçado por uma bala de mosquete. Finalmente, no final do dia, a terceira coluna de Wartensleben chegou e ameaçou flanquear a direita francesa, os franceses recuaram através do rio Elz, destruindo as pontes atrás deles. Alison, pp. 86 e ndash90 Phipps, Vol. II, p. 278. No final da luta do dia, a força de Moreau estava em uma posição precária. Da esquerda para a direita, os franceses foram esticados ao longo de uma linha irregular e quebrada de cerca de. A divisão de Decaen ficava em Riegel e Endingen, na esquina nordeste do Kaiserstuhl, sem mais ajuda para o grosso da força de Moreau. Moreau também perdera um oficial enérgico e promissor em Beaupuy. À direita, a divisão de Saint-Cyr ficava atrás de Denzlingen, e à esquerda se estendia até Unterreute, uma linha fina também separada do centro, em Nimburg (perto de Tenningen e Landeck), a meio caminho entre Riegel e Unterreute. A linha francesa estava voltada para o nordeste em direção aos austríacos, apesar dos sucessos dos Habsburgos ao longo do dia, as forças da coalizão foram incapazes de flanquear a linha francesa e, conseqüentemente, os franceses foram capazes de se retirar em ordem razoavelmente boa para o sul.

Notas, citações e lista alfabética de recursos

Lista alfabética de recursos

* Alison, Archibald (Sir Archibald Alison, 1º Barão). '' History of Europe. '' Londres: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1835. * Blanning, Timothy. '' The French Revolutionary Wars. '' Nova York: Oxford University Press, 1996, * Charles, Arquiduque da Áustria
'' Ausgewählte Schriften weiland seiner kaiserlichen Hoheit des Erzherzogs Carl von Österreich. ''
Viena, W. Braumüller, 1893–94. . * Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. '' Warfare in the Age of Napoleon: The Revolutionary Wars Against the First Coalition in Northern Europe and the Italian Campaign, 1789-1797. '' Leonaur, 2011.. * Dupuy, Roger. '' La période jacobine: terreur, guerre et gouvernement révolutionnaire: 1792 & ndash1794 '', Paris, Seuil, 2005. * Ersch, Johann Samuel
'' Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer folge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889. * Gates, David. '' The Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815, '' New York, Random House, 2011. * Graham, Thomas, Baron Lynedoch
'' A história da campanha de 1796 na Alemanha e na Itália. ''
Londres, 1797.. * Haythornthwaite, Philip. '' Exército austríaco das Guerras Napoleônicas (1): Infantaria. '' Osprey Publishing, 2012. * Huot, Paul. '' Des Vosges au Rhin, excursions et causeries alsaciennes, '' Veuve Berger-Levrault & Fils, Paris, 1868. * Phipps, Ramsay Weston. '' Os Exércitos da Primeira República Francesa: Volume II Os Armées du Moselle, du Rhin, de Sambre-et-Meuse, de Rhin-et-Moselle ''. EUA: Pickle Partners Publishing 2011 reimpressão da publicação original 1920–32. * Rickard, J
'' Batalha de Emmendingen ''
História da guerra
17 de fevereiro de 2009. Acessado em 18 de novembro de 2014. * Rothenburg, Gunther. "O Exército Habsburgo nas Guerras Napoleônicas (1792–1815)". '' Military Affairs '', 37: 1 (fevereiro de 1973), pp. 1-5. * Schroeder, Paul W. '' Transformation of Europe, 1763-1848 '', Clarendon, 1996, capítulos 2-3. * Smith, Digby. '' Napoleonic Wars Data Book. '' Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1999. * Wurzbach, Constant von. '' Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich '' 53. Viena, 1886. * Vann, James Allen. '' O Kreis da Suábia: Crescimento Institucional no Sacro Império Romano 1648–1715. '' Vol. LII, Estudos Apresentados à Comissão Internacional para a História das Instituições Representativas e Parlamentares. Bruxelles, 1975. * Walker, Mack. '' Cidades Nacionais Alemãs: Comunidade, Estado e Propriedade Geral, 1648–1871. '' Ithaca, 1998. <

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Americanos derrotam os britânicos em Yorktown

Desesperadamente preso em Yorktown, Virgínia, o general britânico Lord Cornwallis entrega 8.000 soldados e marinheiros britânicos a uma força franco-americana maior, pondo fim à Revolução Americana.

Lord Cornwallis foi um dos generais britânicos mais capazes da Revolução Americana. Em 1776, ele expulsou as forças do General George Washington & # x2019s Patriots de Nova Jersey, e em 1780 ele obteve uma vitória impressionante sobre o General Horatio Gates & # x2019 Patriot exército em Camden, Carolina do Sul. Cornwallis & # x2019 a invasão subsequente da Carolina do Norte foi menos bem-sucedida, no entanto, e em abril de 1781 ele liderou suas tropas cansadas e maltratadas em direção à costa da Virgínia, onde poderia manter linhas de comunicação marítimas com o grande exército britânico do General Henry Clinton em Nova York Cidade. Depois de conduzir uma série de ataques contra cidades e plantações na Virgínia, Cornwallis se estabeleceu na cidade de Yorktown, onde as marés se instalaram em agosto. The British immediately began fortifying the town and the adjacent promontory of Gloucester Point across the York River.

General George Washington instructed the Marquis de Lafayette, who was in Virginia with an American army of around 5,000 men, to block Cornwallis’ escape from Yorktown by land. In the meantime, Washington’s 2,500 troops in New York were joined by a French army of 4,000 men under the Count de Rochambeau. Washington and Rochambeau made plans to attack Cornwallis with the assistance of a large French fleet under the Count de Grasse, and on August 21 they crossed the Hudson River to march south to Yorktown. Covering 200 miles in 15 days, the allied force reached the head of Chesapeake Bay in early September.

Meanwhile, a British fleet under Admiral Thomas Graves failed to break French naval superiority at the Battle of Virginia Capes on September 5, denying Cornwallis his expected reinforcements. Beginning September 14, de Grasse transported Washington and Rochambeau’s men down the Chesapeake to Virginia, where they joined Lafayette and completed the encirclement of Yorktown on September 28. De Grasse landed another 3,000 French troops carried by his fleet. During the first two weeks of October, the 14,000 Franco-American troops gradually overcame the fortified British positions with the aid of de Grasse’s warships. A large British fleet carrying 7,000 men set out to rescue Cornwallis, but it was too late.

On October 19, General Cornwallis surrendered 7,087 officers and men, 900 seamen, 144 cannons, 15 galleys, a frigate, and 30 transport ships. Pleading illness, he did not attend the surrender ceremony, but his second-in-command, General Charles O’Hara, carried Cornwallis’ sword to the American and French commanders. As the British and Hessian troops marched out to surrender, the British bands played the song “The World Turned Upside Down.”

Although the war persisted on the high seas and in other theaters, the Patriot victory at Yorktown effectively ended fighting in the American colonies. Peace negotiations began in 1782, and on September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed, formally recognizing the United States as a free and independent nation after eight years of war.


Stock markets have the largest-ever one-day crash on "Black Monday"

The largest-ever one-day percentage decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average comes not in 1929 but on October 19, 1987. As a number of unrelated events conspired to tank global markets, the Dow dropped 508 points�.6 percent—in a panic that foreshadowed larger systemic issues.

Confidence on Wall Street had grown throughout the 1980s as the economy pulled out of a slump and President Ronald Reagan implemented business-friendly policies. In October 1987, however, indicators began to suggest that the bull market of the last five years was coming to an end. The government reported a surprisingly large trade deficit, precipitating a decline in the U.S. Dollar. Congress revealed it was considering closing tax loopholes for corporate mergers, worrying investors who were used to loose regulation.

As these concerns grew, Iran attacked two oil tankers off of Kuwait and a freak storm paralyzed England, closing British markets early on the Friday before the crash. The following Monday, U.S. investors awoke to news of turmoil in Asian and European markets, and the Dow began to tumble.

Further compounding the crash was the practice of program trading, the programming of computers to automatically execute trades under certain conditions. Once the rush to sell began, matters were quite literally out of traders’ hands and machines escalated the damage to the market.

Despite looking like the beginning of another Great Depression—the L.A. Times’ headline read �lam on Wall St.” while the New York Daily News’ simply read “PANIC!,” Black Monday has been largely forgotten by Americans not versed in financial history. As it would again in 2008, the federal government took a number of measures to 𠇌orrect” the market, resulting in immediate gains over the next few weeks. By 1989, the market appeared to have made a full recovery. 

Some now interpret the events surrounding Black Monday as proof that boom-and-bust cycles are natural and healthy aspects of modern economics, while others believe it was a missed opportunity to examine and regulate the kind of risky behaviors that led to the crash of 2008.


“Take on Me” music video helps Norway’s A-ha reach the top the U.S. pop charts

From its beginnings in the early 1980s, it was clear that MTV, the Music Television Network, would have a dramatic effect on the way pop stars marketed their music and themselves. While radio remained a necessary engine to drive the sales and chart rankings of singles and albums, the rise of new artists like Duran Duran and the further ascent of established stars like Michael Jackson showed that creativity and esthetic appeal on MTV could make a direct and undeniable contribution to a musical performer’s commercial success. But if ever a case existed in which MTV did more than just contribute to an act’s success, it was the case of the Norwegian band a-Ha, who went from total unknowns to chart-topping pop stars almost solely on the strength of the groundbreaking video for the song “Take On Me,” which hit #1 on the Painel publicitário pop chart on October 19, 1985.

By 1985 the medium was established enough that it took a unique angle to achieve music video stardom. Enter a-Ha, a synth-pop group that caught a late ride on the dying New Wave thanks to the video for “Take On Me,” in which lead singer Morten Harket was transformed using a decades-old technology called Rotoscoping. The creators of the “Take On Me” video painted portions or sometimes the entirety of individual frames to create the effect of a dashingly handsome comic-book motorcycle racer (Harket) romancing a pretty girl from the real world, fighting off a gang of angry pursuers in a pipe-wrench fight before bursting out of the comic-book world as a dashingly handsome real boy.


A Forgotten Army The Irish Yeomanry

‘Peep O’Day Boys’, from Daly’s Ireland in 󈨦(1888). Despite the title the uniforms suggest that villians in the picture are Yeomanry, a reflection of their notoriety in folk memory.

In September 1796, Ireland was pregnant with expectation. The United Irishmen and Defenders planned insurrection and a French invasion was imminent. On 19 September Dublin Castle announced plans to follow Britain’s lead and enlist civilian volunteers as a yeomanry force. In October commissions were issued to local gentlemen and magistrates empowering them to raise cavalry troops and infantry companies. Recruits took the ‘Yeomanry oath’, were officered by the local gentry but were paid, clothed, armed and controlled by government. Their remit was to free the regular army and militia from domestic peacekeeping and do garrison duty if invasion meant troops had to move
to the coast. Service was part-time—usually two ‘exercise days’ per week—except during emergencies when they were called up on ‘permanent duty’.

Folk memory

If the Irish Yeomanry are remembered at all it is usually for their notoriety in the bloody summer of 1798. The popular folk memory of every area which saw action supplies lurid stories from the burning of Father John Murphy’s corpse in a tar barrel at Tullow to the sabreing and mutilation of Betsy Gray after the battle of Ballynahinch. Until recently, the Yeomen have been largely written out of history, apart from early nineteenth century polemics where they appear either as a brutal mob making ‘croppies’ lie down or latter day Williamite saviours. Such neglect belies the Irish Yeomanry’s real significance.
When Belfast’s White Linen Hall was demolished in 1896 to make way for City Hall a glass phial containing a scroll bearing Volunteer reform resolutions was found in its foundations. Two years later another demolition occurred. Ballynahinch loyalists smashed the monument on Betsy Gray’s grave to prevent a 1798 centenary celebration by Belfast Home Rulers. Volunteer radicalism was hermetically sealed in the past while the passions and polarisation engendered in the later 1790s lived and breathed. The Irish Yeomanry played a key role in this critical transition which saw ancient antipathies sharpen and re-assert their baleful influence after a period of relative calm. The ‘Age of Reason’ had briefly promised a brave new world in Ireland. In the 1780s, radical Volunteers favoured Catholic relief along with parliamentary reform. The Boyne Societies, founded to perpetuate the Williamite cause, charged toasting glasses rather than muskets. However the prospect of revolutionary change proved too much to swallow.

Flag of the Lower lveagh Yeoman Cavalry.
(Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

The force raised in 1796 actually bore much more resemblance to the Volunteers, praised by United Irish writers Myles Byrne and Charles Teeling, than to the reactionary and bigoted organisation portrayed in their rebellion histories. In reality, loyalism in 1796 was still a relatively broad church containing an ideological diversity and fluidity reminiscent of Volunteering days. Indeed, the Yeomanry were largely based on the same membership constituency, with frequent continuity of individual or family service. They certainly included the Williamite tradition found in some Volunteer corps but it also encompassed much of the democratic and indeed radical volunteering spirit. Election of officers was common everywhere. Dublin Yeomen, whom Henry Joy McCracken thought ‘liberal’, also elected their captains despite governmental opposition. Even in Armagh, the cockpit of Orangeism, Yeomen varied from Diamond veterans in the Crowhill infantry to radical ex-Volunteers enrolled by Lord Charlemont despite quibbles over the oath and the inclusion of some erstwhile francophiles who had recently erected a liberty tree.
In 1796, there was no inconsistency about this. Grattan dubbed the Yeomanry ‘an ascendancy army’ but in reality the United Irishmen were in the ascendant while the loyalist response was fragmented and in danger of being overwhelmed. The initial priority was defence: to trawl in all varieties of loyalty and provide a structure to prevent people being neutralised or becoming United Irishmen.

More Catholics than Orangemen

The new Yeomanry was therefore a surprisingly diverse force, given its subsequent reputation. The government denied any intention of excluding Catholics or Presbyterians but the system already had the potential for denominational

and ideological filtering. Being a Yeoman was a desirable position conveying social status plus pay, clothing, arms and training. Applications exceeded places, which were limited by financial and security considerations. This meant selection locally and government reliance on local landowners’ judgement.
Sometimes recruits had no choice. In some areas only Protestants volunteered, in others the Catholic Committee sabotaged Catholic enlistment. In Loughinsholin, where Presbyterians offered Catholics withdrew and vice-versa. Where there was competition to enter a limited number of corps, choices were unavoidable. Downshire allowed Catholics in his cavalry but faced mutually exclusive Protestant and Catholic infantry offers from the same parishes and opted for the former. In Orange areas, some landowners deliberately selected their Yeomen directly from the local lodge. Occasionally a precarious balance was attempted by including proportions of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. The Farney corps in Monaghan started this way. However the first levy produced a predominantly Anglican force. There were Presbyterian Yeomen in mid-Ulster but the strength of the United Irishmen in eastern counties meant relatively few corps were raised there in 1796.
Wealthy, property-owning Catholics, on the other hand, were admitted into cavalry corps. There was an element of tokenism in this: Yeomanry offers of service sometimes highlighted Catholic members, which they never did for the Protestant denominations. In this way it can be estimated that at the very least ten per cent of the first national levy of 20,000 Yeomen were Catholic, thus outnumbering the Orange yeomen who in 1796 were only to be found in some corps in the Orange districts of mid-Ulster.
Forming a Yeomanry force in the deteriorating conditions of 1796 gave the initiative briefly back to Dublin Castle but this disappeared in the crisis following the Bantry Bay invasion attempt. The United Irishmen drew great encouragement from its near success and felt themselves strong enough to switch their policy on the Yeomanry from intimidation to infiltration. As a response, purges of Yeomanry corps began in Ulster and Leinster in the spring of 1797.

Orange links

Many Catholics were expelled from corps in Wicklow and Wexford on suspicion of being ‘United’. In mid-Ulster General John Knox devised a ‘test oath’ obliging Yeomen to publicly swear they were not United Irishmen. This got results and several corps were cleared of disaffected members. The Presbyterian secretary of the Farney corps was expelled following his confession of United Irish membership while Catholics were removed on the pretext of a political resolution they had issued. Knox followed up the expulsions by permitting augmentations of Orangemen into some northern corps. Although Orangemen quietly joined some corps in 1796 this was the first time they had official approval.
Knox clinched this by engineering Orange resolutions for Castle consumption. This was a risky strategy, given the recent disturbances in Armagh. Knox, a correspondent of the radical MP Arthur O’Connor, privately disapproved of Orangeism but believed the dangerous predicament he faced merited utilising it as a short-term expedient. However, with the United Irish-Defender alliance growing, the precedent inherent in this strategy would have profound and lasting consequences. Almost immediately, symptoms of polarisation appeared. A Tyrone clergyman noted approvingly, ‘Our parties are all obviously merged into two: loyalists and traitors’.

Castlereagh’s secret policy

However the critical Yeomanry-Orange connection was still to come. By 1798 Orangeism had been adopted by many northern gentry and spread to Dublin where a framework national organisation was established. As insurrection loomed, this provided a ready-made supply of loyal manpower. There were around 18,000 Yeomen in Ulster whereas the Orangemen were conservatively reckoned at 40,000. In March the Dublin leaders offered the Ulster Orangemen to the government if it would arm them. The viceroy, Camden, was scared of offending Catholics in the Militia and hestitated. However, the appointment of an Irishman—Lord Castlereagh—as acting chief secretary offered a solution. On 16 April 1798 he ordered northern Yeomanry commanders to organise 5,000 ‘supplementary’ men to be armed in an emergency. Camden and Castlereagh had privately decided that, where possible, these would be Orangemen.
In tandem with the supplementary plan, regular Yeomen were given a more military role. They were put on permanent duty and integrated into contingency plans for garrisoning key towns at the outbreak of trouble. This had one very important side-effect. In the cramped conditions of garrison life and the panic occasioned by the influx of rural loyalists, Orangeism spread like wildfire amongst both Yeomanry and regular units. This spontaneous, ground-level spread of Orangeism operated simultaneously with Castlereagh’s secret emergency policy to utilise Orange manpower in Ulster. The Yeomanry system proved the ideal facilitator for both.

Drum of the Aughnahoe[County Tyrone] Yeoman Infantry. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

On 1 July 1798 in the Presbyterian town of Belfast, once the epicentre of United Irish activity, it was noted that ‘Every man…has a red coat on’. This would have been inconceivable in 1796 when there was great difficulty enlisting Yeomen. However, it was now government policy to separate northern Presbyterians from the United Irishmen. Again the Yeomanry played a key role. Castlereagh admitted privately that the arrest of the Down United colonel, William Steel Dickson was an exception to ‘the policy of acting against the Catholick [sic] rather than the Presbyterian members of the union [United Irishmen]’. Government supporters industriously spread news of the Scullabogue massacre (See HI Autumn 1996) to stir up atavistic fears. The Yeomanry was expanded considerably to meet the emergency and ex-radicals were no longer discouraged. In effect, the Yeomanry functioned as a safety net. Joining up offered an acceptable and very public ‘way back’ for wavering radicals. Although there were some Presbyterian Yeomen in 1796, many more joined in mid-1798. Charlemont’s friend, the Anglican clergyman Edward Hudson, exploited a ‘schism’ between Presbyterian and Catholic to enlist the former in his Portglenone corps, sardonically noting ‘the brotherhood of affection is over’. By 1799, he claimed ‘the word “Protestant”, which was becoming obsolete in the north, has regained its influence and all of that description seem drawing closer together’. Thus the Yeomanry oath was often a rite of passage for Presbyterians keen to end their flirtation with revolution.

The 1798 rebellion had a profound impact on the psyche of Protestant Ireland, conjuring up anew spectres of 1641. When news of the rising hit Dublin, Camden described the apocalyptic atmosphere to Pitt. The rebellion

literally made the Protestant part of this country mad…it is scarcely possible to restrain the violence of my own immediate friends and advisors…they are prepared for extirpation and any appearance of lenity…raises a flame which runs like wildfire thro’ the streets.

Mercy was indeed scarce until Cornwallis replaced Camden and the rebellion was effectively crushed. Up to this juncture, the interests of most Protestants and the government were running parallel, a partnership potently symbolised by the Yeomanry, now blooded in the rebellion. Many embattled Protestants saw the parallel interests as identical: through the smouldering fires of rebellion they confused expediency with permanent policy.
Cornwallis, a professional soldier, voiced his contempt for the barbarity of the local amateur forces, particularly the Yeomanry. For many, criticism of the Yeomanry was construed as attacking Protestant interests. Yeomanry service under Camden and the relationship it represented was now seen as an unalterable ‘gold standard’. When government policy ran counter to perceived Protestant interests, loyalty was qualified with distrust and a feeling of betrayal. Camden was toasted as ‘the father of the Yeomanry’ while Cornwallis was lampooned as ‘Croppywallis’.

Lt. Col. William Blacker, Yeoman and Oraneman
(Dublin University Magazine 1841)

The Yeomanry and the Union

When it emerged that Pitt intended legislative union, antagonism towards Cornwallis sharpened. As union would remove emancipation from Ireland’s control, ultra-Protestant loyalty faced a severe test. Many Yeomen and Orangemen opposed the measure, particularly in Dublin where lawyers and merchants also faced a loss of professional and mercantile status. The Yeomanry, which it was claimed saved Ireland in 1798, were at the cutting edge of the anti-union campaign. A mutiny was threatened in Dublin with Volunteer-type rhetoric, but the bluster of 1782 proved hot air in post-rebellion Ireland. In the last analysis Protestants depended on the Yeomanry and the Yeomen depended on the government. The consequences of disbandment made union seem the lesser evil. Cornwallis rushed reinforcements to Dublin but the bluff had called itself.
Jonah Barrington later claimed the Volunteers were loyal to their country [Ireland] and their king while the Yeomen looked to ‘the king of England and his ministers’. Barrington’s jibe about patriotism was the peevish reaction of an incorrigible anti-unionist, yet a subtle alteration in the nature and focus of loyalty had occurred. The Volunteers’ ‘patriotism’ flourished in an atmosphere where they faced no real internal threat. While many Yeomen opposed the abolition of the Irish parliament, the experience of 1798 made challenging the executive a luxury they could not afford. On the surface, the switch of loyalty from College Green to Dublin Castle seemed relatively smooth: Yeomanry corps quickly adopted the post-1800 union flag in their colours. Yet, alongside this, a new focus of loyalty emerged to co-exist with this sometimes grudging allegiance. The ‘Protestant nationalism’ of 1782 was transformed into a clenching loyalty to the increasingly insecure interests of Irish Protestants.

Politicisation and Protestantism

The Yeomanry soon became a major component in post-union politics, a conduit between government and substantial numbers of Protestants who increasingly saw the force as symbolising the survival of their social and political position. They functioned as a political tool. When Hardwicke, the new viceroy, wanted to send a conciliatory message to nervous Protestants he reviewed the entire Dublin Yeomanry in Phoenix Park, then lavished hospitality on the officers in a banquet afterwards. It was a two-way process: Protestants could use the Yeomanry to put government in their debt. The continuance of war in 1803 meant a large increase in the Yeomanry from 63,000 to around 80,000. Emmet’s rising, coming when this augmentation was on foot, gave Protestants another opportunity to appear indispensable by extending their monopoly of the Yeomanry. The means by which this was accomplished ranged from high-level manoeuvring to parish pump politics.
As a partisan Yeomanry would be viewed in a poor light at Westminster, Hardwicke attempted a balance by considering some purely Catholic corps. However the Louth MP Fortesque threatened impeachment if he proceeded. Even the chief secretary, Wickham, considered Catholic corps ‘unsafe’ as they would inflame loyalist opinion and ‘be not cried but roared out against throughout all Ireland’. At a local level, Arthur Browne, the Prime Sergeant of Limerick, observed that Yeomanry corps in each town he passed on circuit effectively excluded Catholics by submitting prospective recruits to a ballot of existing members. This said, the Protestant monopoly was never total. Catholic Yeomen remained in areas of sparse Protestant settlement like Kerry. Moreover, there was still a scattering of liberal Protestants, usually at officer level, like Lieutenant Barnes of the Armagh Yeomanry. However, the general tendency was clear. When it became known Barnes had signed an emancipation petition, the privates mutinied and flung down their arms.

In the early nineteenth century, the passions generated by 1798 mixed with the politics of the Catholic Question. The continued existence of the Yeomanry allowed Protestants to demonstrate that their traditional control of law and order was intact as the campaign for emancipation built up. Yeomanry parades and the use of the force in assisting magistrates with mundane law and order matters assumed great symbolic importance as tangible manifestations of the fractures in Irish society. Yeomanry corps inevitably became involved in local clashes in an increasingly sectarianised atmosphere. In 1807, the government prevented Enniscorthy Yeomen celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Vinegar Hill as it raised sectarian tensions. In 1808 Yeomen were among a mob which disrupted a St John’s Eve bonfire and ‘garland’ near Newry, provoking a riot in which one man died. During the disturbances which swept Kerry and Limerick the same year, isolated Protestant Yeomen were singled out for attacks and arms raids. Since penal times, possession or dispossession of arms scored political points. Protestant insecurity and Catholic alienation fed off each other. O’Connell, ironically once a Yeoman himself, upped the ante by lambasting the force as symbolising a partisan magistracy.
The Yeomanry presented governments with a dilemma: was their strategic utility worth the political price? While war with France continued and the regular army was depleted for overseas service, they provided an important source of additional manpower and were particularly useful during invasion scares when they could free up the remaining regular garrison and maintain a local presence to deter co-ordinated action by the disaffected. Moreover, they served an unofficial purpose by keeping potentially turbulent Protestants under discipline.
The decision was deferred and the dilemma submerged. For much of the 1820s the Yeomanry lingered on, a rather moribund force seen by officials as a liability which could not be disbanded for fear of a Protestant reaction, particularly in Ulster where the force was numerically strongest. The advent of the denominationally inclusive County Constabulary in 1822 further touched Protestant insecurity by removing much of the functional justification for Yeomanry. There was no love lost between the two forces. In 1830 William McMullan of the Lurgan infantry was arrested by his own captain, yelling at the head of a mob rioting against the police, ‘we have plenty of arms and ammunition and can use them as well as you’. Ironically in that year the Whig chief secretary, Stanley, had decided to re-clothe and re-arm the Yeomanry as part of the response to the southern Tithe War. Stanley’s experiment proved disastrous as sectarian clashes developed.
In some districts the sight of a red coat was like a red rag to a bull. In 1831, the rescue of two heifers destrained for tithe sparked an appalling incident in Newtownbarry. A mob of locals tried to release the cattle, the magistrates called for Yeomanry and stones were thrown. When one Yeoman fell with a fractured skull, the others opened fire killing fourteen countrymen. The viceroy, Anglesey, tried to limit the political damage by initiating a progressive dismantling of the Yeomanry starting with a stand-down of the permanent sergeants which meant the Yeomen could no longer drill. This phasing-out took three years and was intentionally gradual, starving the Yeomanry of the oxygen of duty and pay, thus letting them pass away naturally if not gracefully. It was rightly felt this approach would be less likely to provoke a political reaction than sudden disbandment which, for a Protestant community coming to terms with emancipation, would have been like an amputation without anaesthetic.

Yeomanry belt plates – Glenauly [County Fermanagh]
Infantry and Belfast Merchant’s Crops. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

Although the Yeomanry’s official existence ended in 1834, the last rusty muskets were not removed from their dusty stores till the early 1840s. With unintentional but obvious symbolism, they were escorted to the ordnance stores by members of the new constabulary. Although gone, the Yeomen were most certainly not forgotten. For one thing, they were seen as the most recent manifestation of a tradition of Protestant self-defence stretching back to plantation requirements of armed service from tenants then re-surfacing in different forms such as the Williamite county associations, the eighteenth-century Boyne Societies, anti-Jacobite associations of 1745 and the Volunteers. Such identification had been eagerly promoted. At the foundation of an Apprentice Boys’ club in 1813, Colonel Blacker, a Yeoman and Orangeman, amalgamated the siege tradition, the Yeomanry and 1798 in a song entitled The Crimson Banner:

Again when treason maddened round,
and rebel hordes were swarming,
were Derry’s sons the foremost found,
for King and Country arming.

Moreover, the idea of a yeomanry remained as a structural template for local, gentry-led self-defence, particularly in Ulster. When volunteering was revived in Britain in 1859, northern Irish MPs like Sharman Crawford tried unsuccessfully to use the Yeomanry precedent to get similar Irish legislation. Yeomanry-like associations were mooted in the second Home Rule crisis of 1893. The Ulster Volunteer Force of 1911-14—often led by the same families like Knox of Dungannon—defined their role like Yeomen, giving priority to local defence and exhibiting great reluctance to leave their own districts for training in brigades.
The strong Orange-Yeomanry connection—itself part of a wider process of militarisation in Irish society—has left an enduring imprint on Orangeism which can be seen in the marching fife and drum bands and in various military regalia such as ceremonial swords and pikes. Even the name is still retained by the Moira Yeomanry Loyal Orange Lodge. The town or parish basis of Yeomanry corps mirrored the dynamics of the plantations and helped catapult the territorial mind-set of both ‘planter’ and ‘native’ into the nineteenth century and beyond. Weekly Yeomanry parades defined territory in the same way as rural drumming parties in the nineteenth century and marches, murals and coloured kerbstones in the twentieth.

Alan Blackstock works in the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland.

The formation of the Orange Order, 1795-98: the edited papers of Colonel William Blacker and Colonel Robert H. Wallace (Belfast 1994).

T. Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation (Dublin 1992).

G. Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36 (London 1970).

H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836 (London and Toronto 1966).


Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796 - History

This is a finding aid. It is a description of archival material held in the Wilson Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Unless otherwise noted, the materials described below are physically available in our reading room, and not digitally available through the World Wide Web. See the Duplication Policy section for more information.

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Tamanho 1.0 feet of linear shelf space (approximately 372 items)
Resumo Edmund Walter Jones (1811-1876) was a planter at Clover Hill in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Early items in the collection are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law, William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport (b. 1839), John Thomas (1842-1864) and Walter L. (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator. Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.
O Criador Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
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The following terms from Library of Congress Subject Headings suggest topics, persons, geography, etc. interspersed through the entire collection the terms do not usually represent discrete and easily identifiable portions of the collection--such as folders or items.

Clicking on a subject heading below will take you into the University Library's online catalog.

  • Avery family.
  • Bounties, Military--United States--History--Mexican War, 1846-1848.
  • Clover Hill Plantation (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • College students--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Estados Confederados da América. Army--Military life.
  • Estados Confederados da América. Army. North Carolina Infantry Regiment, 26th.
  • Davenport, William, fl. 1789-1821.
  • Family--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Happy Valley (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • Jones family.
  • Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1771-1844.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1848-1920.
  • Jones, John Thomas, 1842-1864.
  • Jones, Walter L., d. 1863.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Lawyers--North Carolina--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir (N.C.)--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir family.
  • North Carolina--Boundaries--Tennessee.
  • North Carolina--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.
  • North Carolina--Politics and government--1865-1950.
  • Patterson family.
  • Plantations--North Carolina--Caldwell County.
  • Real estate investment--United States--History--19th century.
  • Soldiers--Confederate States of America--Correspondence.
  • Southern States--Description and travel.
  • Surveyors--North Carolina--History.
  • Tennessee--Boundaries--North Carolina.
  • University of North Carolina (1793-1962)--Students--History--19th century.
  • Virginia--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.

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Edmund Walter Jones of Clover Hill, situated about six miles north of Lenoir in Caldwell County, N.C., was the son of Edmund Jones and his wife Ann Lenoir Jones of Palmyra. His grandfathers were William Lenoir and George Jones. Edmund Walter Jones married his cousin Sophia Caroline Davenport, daughter of William Davenport and his wife Mary Lenoir Gordon Davenport of The Fountain (or Walnut Fountain). All of these homes were located in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Edmund Walter and Sophia Jones had four sons and one daughter: Colonel John T. Jones, who was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness on 6 May 1864 Private Walter L. Jones, who was mortally wounded at Gettysburg Captain William Davenport Jones, a member of General Collet Leventhorpe's staff who was also wounded and Edmund Jones, legislator and lawyer. Colonel John Thomas Jones served in the 1st North Carolina Volunteers and then as an officer in the 26th North Carolina Regiment under Zebulon B. Vance and Henry K. Burgwyn, and in the brigade of James Johnston Pettigrew. He was a lieutenant colonel when he was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness. Walter L. Jones attended Hillsboro Military Academy in 1860, became a soldier, and was killed at Gettysburg. Edmund Jones (1848-1920), called Edmund Jones, Jr. and nicknamed Coot, studied at Bingham Academy, served briefly in the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry in 1865, and after the war studied at the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia. In later years, he farmed at Clover Hill, practiced law in Lenoir, and served in the N.C. legislature.

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The earlier papers are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest and wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport Jones, John Thomas Jones (1842-1864) and Walter L. Jones (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund Jones (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, N.C., lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator.

Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill Plantation and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.


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